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Abstract
As a vital instrument for the governance of limited 
liability companies in China, the shareholder agreement 
has been approved by the Company Law of a great 
number of countries by virtue of its positive significance 
in building the private order of the governance of limited 
liability companies and protecting the legitimate rights 
and interests of shareholders in the company. However, 
there is still a lack of clear and systematic norms in the 
legal system of China. Currently, in practice, a number 
of shareholders of limited liability companies have 
established shareholder agreements to adjust their rights 
and obligations stipulated in the Company Law and 
articles of association. Under such circumstance, both 
as the embodiment of the will of shareholders, in case 
of a conflict between the shareholder agreement and the 
articles of association on the governance structure or 
regulations of the company, the solution to the conflict is 
the object of this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
As essential tools and approaches for shareholders to 
realize their rights and interests in the company as well 
as the corporate governance in the company, despite 
that both are the manifestation of shareholders’ will, the 
effectiveness of shareholder agreement and articles of 
association are significantly different. Different from 
the articles of association, there is no specific provision 
on shareholder agreement in the Chinese Company 
Law, which leads to various debates on the applicability 
of shareholder agreement in practice among Chinese 
scholars (Xu & Wang, 2016. p.3). Generally speaking, 
the rights and obligations of shareholders are regulated 
by the Company Law and the articles of association, 
and given that in a public company, shareholders are 
free to transfer their shares and usually do not know 
each other, the method seems appropriate. However, 
in the limited liability companies with a characteristic 
of human joining, this approach fails to fully meet the 
demands of shareholders to participate in the management 
of the company. In practice, a number of shareholders 
of limited liability companies adjust their rights and 
obligations stipulated in the Company Law and articles 
of association through the establishment of shareholder 
agreement, which shall affect the governance structure 
of the company. Having been actually widely adopted in 
the current practice of corporate governance in China, 
shareholder agreements have even suspended or replaced 
the articles of association thoroughly in some cases 
(Chen, 2013, p.3). Under such circumstance, both as 
the embodiment of the will of shareholders, in case of 
a conflict between the shareholder agreement and the 
articles of association on the governance structure or 
regulations of the company, the solution to the conflict is 
the object of this paper.
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1 .   T H E  D I F F E R E N C E  B E T W E E N 
THE SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT 
AND THE COMPANY’S ARTICLES OF 
ASSOCIATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE CHINESE COMPANY LAW
1.1  The Difference of Legal Nature
With the dual nature of autonomy and contractual at 
the same time, in addition to the contract between 
the company and shareholders in a simple sense, the 
articles of association of the company also has the 
nature of “constitution” to regulate the small group 
within the company (Stepthen, 2010, p.106). Therefore, 
the articles of association of the company are endowed 
certain meaning of “Law” by greatly breaking through 
the relativity of a contract, and thus becomes a “rule of 
autonomy” (Wu, 2015, p.5). On the contrary, the nature 
of shareholder agreement is generally considered to 
be a contract quite similar to partnership agreement, 
that is, a long-term contract signed by most parties to 
reach an agreement on the relationship between the 
internal operation and management of the company 
and the distribution of economic interests and control 
rights between shareholders (Li, 2018). Therefore, as 
a contract in which the parties express the same will, 
it should be under the adjustment of the contract law. 
Nevertheless, since what the shareholder agreement 
involves is the management of related matters such as 
corporate governance between shareholders rather than 
the general contract, its content should also be subject to 
the restriction the Company Law (Cadman, 2004, p.3).
1.2  The Difference of Legal Status
As a legal document reflecting the demands and 
characteristics of the company that is formulated in 
accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Company 
Law and a written document manifesting the common 
will of all promoters and even all shareholders, and 
prepared by the promoters, the articles of association is a 
requisite document for the establishment of the company. 
Article 11 and article 25 of the Company Law are the 
legal source of articles of association in the Company 
Law of China. Conversely, a shareholder agreement is a 
voluntary agreement between shareholders, rather than a 
necessary condition for the establishment of a company. It 
may express the common will of all shareholders or only 
part of the shareholders. In spite of the different opinions 
on the legal source of shareholder agreement in China’s 
Company Law, it is stipulated by article 34 of the law that 
a limited liability company may not receive dividends 
or give priority to capital contribution in line with the 
proportion of capital contribution after being “agreed 
by all shareholders”; It is also stated in Article 41 of the 
law that in a limited liability company, “unless otherwise 
agreed by all shareholders”, the requirement to give notice 
15 days prior to the shareholders’ meeting shall not be 
complied with. In accordance with the above provisions, 
the shareholders of a limited liability company may at 
least make agreements in the form of agreement in the 
case of dividend distribution, capital increase and share 
expansion as well as the notification of shareholders’ 
meetings, which are suitable for the actual situation of the 
company (Zhang, 2010, p.7). It is thereby believed by this 
paper that though the term “shareholder agreement” does 
not appear in the Company Law, the provisions of Chinese 
Company Law that allow shareholders to agree on their 
own can still serve as the legal source in the determination 
of the effectiveness of shareholder agreements in practice, 
and provide certain legal support for the existence of 
shareholder agreements in practice.
1.3  The Difference of Binding Object
The articles of association of the company, as a requisite 
document for the establishment of the company, have 
a larger number of restraining objects exceeding that 
of the shareholder agreement. As stipulated by article 
11 of the Company Law of China, in addition to the 
restraining force on the company, shareholders, directors, 
supervisors and senior managerial personnel, the articles 
of association are also restrictive for the shareholders 
who join the company after its establishment. Due to the 
relativity nature of contracts, however, the restraining 
force of the shareholder agreement only applies to the 
shareholders who have signed the agreement instead 
of being restrictive for other shareholders, and those 
shareholders who have joined later, may become parties 
to the shareholder agreement by making a commitment of 
willing to be bound by the agreement.
1.4  The Difference of Methods to Formulate and 
Amend
As major change items of the company, the formulation 
and amendment of the articles of association shall be 
jointly decided by all shareholders, and its approval 
shall only be based on the principle of “Majority Rule” 
(approved by shareholders representing more than two-
thirds of the voting rights) rather than obtaining the 
unanimous approval of all shareholders.1 By comparison, 
the formulation and amendment of the shareholder 
agreement shall be subject to the unanimous consent 
of the shareholders who have signed the agreement. 
Might be concluded by partial or by all shareholders, the 
shareholder agreement is only valid for the shareholders 
who have signed it,  while the amendment of the 
shareholder agreement shall be unanimously agreed by all 
shareholders who have signed it.
1.5  The Difference of Publicity Level
The articles of association have the nature of publicity. 
1 Article 43, Chinese Company Law.
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According to the Company Law, the articles of association 
of a company should be registered with the industrial 
and commercial administration authorities and shall 
be available for inspection by shareholders and other 
stakeholders according to law.2 On the contrary, the 
shareholder agreement has the nature of privacy. It 
can only bind the parties to the agreement and has 
no obligation to disclose it to others. Confidentiality 
obligations are also covered by certain shareholder 
agreements.
2.  DISPUTES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS IN 
CHINA’S PRACTICE
2.1  Relationship of Shareholder Agreement 
and Articles of Association: Supplement or 
Replacement
Recently, shareholder agreements have been increasingly 
used in Chinese corporations and corporate judicial 
practices that have led to the emergence of “agreement 
replacing governance” (Chen, 2013, p.2). Although the 
shareholder agreement can be used to fill the gaps in of 
the articles of association of company, it, which represents 
the will of the shareholders, cannot replace the will of 
corporation represented by the organizational structure of 
the company, and beyond the background of “corporate 
legal person independence”.
In fact,  signing a shareholder agreement as a 
supplement should be regarded as normal in the case 
that the shareholders of a limited liability company 
tend to avoid the shareholders’ meeting and the board 
of directors fails to play their roles as predicted, which 
is because this actually reflects the affirmation of the 
company’s organization in a sense. On condition that all 
shareholders reach the “unanimity” without convening 
a general meeting of shareholders, it may be deemed 
that the procedural rules of the organization for making 
a resolution (voting) on the matter have been amended 
and the unanimous opinion on the matter itself have 
been achieved as well. The article 38, paragraph 2 of 
the Company Law of China actually directly grant the 
effectiveness of such shareholder agreement with that of 
the company resolution, that is, the company can directly 
adopt the form of shareholder agreement on company 
affairs and make decisions by unanimous consent of 
all shareholders without convening the shareholders’ 
meeting and the board of directors. Whereas, some 
shareholder agreements often contain other key issues 
related to corporate governance, such as the authority of 
shareholders’ meeting, the authority of board of directors 
2 Article 20 of Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
Administration of Registration of Companies
and even the candidates of directors and managers 
(Bebchuk, n.d., pp.833-914), which usually result in 
conflicts between shareholder agreement and the articles 
of association. Under such context, normally shareholder 
agreements cannot replace the articles of association. 
Nevertheless, Chinese companies are more likely to 
achieve corporate governance by directly substituting 
resolutions of the board of shareholders with agreements 
of shareholders. Such pattern of behavior, which almost 
completely neglects the organization and procedure 
of the company, has overridden the Company Law to 
some extent. In addition to replacing the resolution 
formed through the formal procedures stipulated by the 
Company Law, in order to avoid the constraint of articles 
of association, the shareholder agreement in some cases 
also directly agrees that it will be included in the article of 
association as a part of it, which, due to the great sacrifice 
of the of the values of company organization such as 
efficiency and fairness, makes the articles of association 
become an insignificant decoration. The difference 
between agreement and collective decision lies in the 
relationship between consensus and majority rule. An 
agreement is about individual consent to be bound, while 
majority rule is about group and company consent. Both 
of them demonstrate significant functional differences in 
the efficiency and fairness of organization. In the case that 
all company procedures are ignored and substituted with 
agreements of shareholders, matters and differences that 
should be decided and solved by the voting mechanism 
of the company will evolve into endless contract disputes 
and conflicts due to the failure of reaching the consensus 
through negotiation. This mode of operation, which is 
of no distinct difference from the external market of 
enterprises, leads to the loss of decision-making function 
and efficiency function of organizational mechanism 
and rules, which is also one of the frequent agreement 
disputes between shareholders arising in recent years. 
From the perspective of fairness, despite that the approach 
of shareholders’ s agreement on the surface ensures that 
the will of all shareholders is respected, considering 
the different degrees of disclosure of information and 
procedures in the process of consultation, negotiation and 
signing, in fact, small and medium-sized shareholders 
are more likely to be squeezed by large shareholders due 
to individual consultations and information asymmetry 
in the agreement negotiation. Even if an agreement is 
reached, it is doubtful whether it can truly fully reflect the 
will of all shareholders and fairly safeguard the interests 
of them. For all that these issues may not be noticeable 
in companies with a small number of shareholders, in 
companies with a large number of shareholders where 
the will of shareholders differs greatly from that of the 
company rather than being consistent, and the company 
is not equal to the sum of the will of all shareholders, 
the articles of association cannot be replaced by the 
shareholder agreement.  The agreement reached by 
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consensus of all shareholders can be regarded as a 
supplement to the articles of association of the company 
only upon there is no provision on the matter agreed in the 
shareholder agreement in the articles of association of the 
company.
2.2  The Influence of Force of Shareholder’s 
Agreement on Corporate Governance Structure
Corporate governance structure is generally considered 
to be the company’s advantage over other enterprises. 
With the deepening understanding of the human joining 
of limited liability companies in recent years, the reform 
of the system of limited liability companies has been 
carried out in a number of countries and regions, which 
grants limited liability companies more autonomy. The 
provisions of the Company Law on the establishment 
of company organs and the division of the authority 
of various company organs are generally considered 
to be mandatory (Xu, 2017, p.2). However, one of the 
common contents of shareholders’ agreement of limited 
liability companies is to change the authority range of 
shareholders’ meeting and board of directors as well as 
strengthen or reduce the responsibilities or obligations 
of some shareholders (Worthington, n.d.). For example, 
how effective is a management agreement when the 
shareholders of a limited liability company hand over 
the company to a certain shareholder through a private 
agreement and completely suspend the board of directors? 
In fact, this kind of agreement not only changes the 
governance structure and authority arrangement of the 
shareholder meeting, board of directors and board of 
supervisors in the company, which is stipulated in the 
Company Law in advance, but also violates the principle 
of limited liability of shareholders. People’s doubt for the 
existence value of the Company Law will be inevitably 
caused by such management and operation agreement 
between shareholders. At present, there are mainly two 
opinions among Chinese scholars on this. One of them 
holds that although it is an essential principle of the 
Company Law, the principle of company legalism is 
not necessarily violated when shareholders transfer the 
management right of the company to shareholders after 
the establishment of the company. That is to say, the 
contract operation agreement of the company is merely a 
partial modification of the company’s daily management 
right and dividend distribution, which will not bring 
the complete collapse of the corporate governance 
system. Therefore, it is unreasonable to generalize the 
effectiveness of the management and operation contract 
signed between shareholders. The other opinion is that 
the company contracted to some certain shareholders 
in the form of contract is essentially agreed to replace 
the board operation with contracted operation, which 
shall be considered null and void in that it violates the 
specific provisions on the authorities of the board of 
directors in the Company Law and the company’s articles 
of association, eliminate the company’s independent 
personality, increase the risks faced by creditors and 
infringes the right of shareholders to request profit 
distribution. The influence of these two different views on 
the judge’s discretion in the face of shareholder agreement 
disputes leads to different results in the judgment of 
Chinese courts on shareholder agreements.
2.3  The Influence of Force of Shareholder’s 
Agreement on Creditors
Despite that it is conducive to the construction of 
the private order of corporate governance and is the 
embodiment of the spirit of judicial autonomy, the 
shareholder agreement is after all a change to the order 
stipulated in the Company Law and will affect the interests 
of the third party of the company. For all that the creditors 
of the company tend to focus on merely whether their 
creditor rights can be paid off by the liability property of 
the company rather than the company’s internal operation 
process, the company is not in the form of partnership 
merely relying on “agreement” to stipulate its governance 
structure and management (Wang, 2017, p.5). It is worth 
noting that the biggest difference between a company and 
a partnership is the limited liability system. In the case that 
the company’s decisions fail to be made by the effective 
corporate governance organization, namely the general 
meeting of shareholders and the board of directors, but 
is agreed to be managed by all or part of shareholders or 
a third party in the form of agreement, creditors may not 
necessarily know the situation considering the privacy 
nature of the shareholder agreement. However, once there 
are problems in the operation and management of the 
company, the creditors of the company can only request 
the company to assume the liability for debt repayment, 
while the company can only bear the limited liability 
with its independent property, which may increase the 
possibility of piercing the corporate veil of the company 
and lead to a considerable impact on the creditors due to 
their rights and interests without be well protected.
3.  AFFIRMATION OF THE FORCE OF 
SHAREHOLDER’S AGREEMENT
It is believed by this paper that the following steps 
should be followed in determining the effectiveness of an 
agreement between the shareholders of a limited liability 
company other than the articles of association:
First of all, it should be confirmed that the shareholder 
agreement is a private agreement between shareholders 
or a corporate governance agreement (Wang, 2017, p.4). 
The so-called private agreement between shareholders 
refers to a private agreement concluded by two or more 
shareholders for the purpose of agreeing on the rights 
and obligations of each other and not directly related 
to corporate collective governance. For example, a 
binding agreement on voting rights concluded between 
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some shareholders within a company can generally be 
considered as a private agreement between shareholders, 
which is because that, as an approach for shareholders 
to compete for control rights in essence, the agreement 
mainly affects the balanced relationship between 
shareholders’ control rights and will not significantly 
change the overall interests and governance structure of 
the whole company. Given that it is generally considered 
not to have a significant impact on the company’s overall 
interest and governance structure, the shareholder’s 
private agreement is valid for shareholders concerned. In 
contrast, the corporate governance agreement refers to the 
agreement concluded by the company’s shareholders with 
the aim of managing and operating the company, which is 
usually formulated by all shareholders and will generally 
affect and change the overall interests and governance 
structure of the company. In spite that the signing subject 
of the corporate governance agreement is limited to 
shareholders, the possible impact of the agreement 
on the corporate governance structure, the interests of 
collation and even the interests of third parties such as 
external creditors leads to its complexity and greater 
judgment difficulty. The disputes about the determination 
of the force of shareholder agreement mainly occur in 
this type of shareholder agreement. The following two 
aspects should be taken into consideration in case of such 
agreements.
Secondly, it is necessary to identify whether a 
mandatory legal provision has been violated (Chad, 1957, 
pp. 68-79). The so-called mandatory provision refers to 
the standard that has to be applied in accordance with 
the law and shall not be subject to change and exclusion 
of the application by personal will. Its purpose is to set 
the bottom line for the behavior of shareholders or the 
company, so as to ensure that the shareholder agreement 
is not easily recognized as invalid in the case that the 
internal agreement between shareholders is not violating 
the prohibitive provision of the Company Law and is in 
line with the provisions on the formation and effectiveness 
of the contract in the contract law. Where the key is 
whether the contract refuses to apply to the mandatory 
provision in corporate governance and accounting systems 
or the like in the Company Law, such rejection might 
be deemed invalid if it is applicable to these mandatory 
provisions, which otherwise will be regarded as valid.
Thirdly, it should be confirmed whether there is 
any provision infringing on the interests of creditors. 
The  de te rmina t ion  of  the  e ffec t iveness  o f  the 
shareholder agreement requires the examination of 
whether the agreement will change the interests of the 
company’s creditors. That is to say, in addition to the 
possible stuntedness of the discussion functions of 
the shareholders’ meeting and the board of directors, 
shareholder’s agreement may not have negative external 
effects on the distribution of management power within 
the company. The effectiveness of the shareholder 
agreement shall be admitted as long as it doesn’t change 
the nature of the company’s independent personality and 
shareholder limited responsibility, in the case that the 
company’s management power distribution matters and 
profit distribution does not actually damage a third person 
or the interests of the creditors or lead to imbalance 
of negotiation capacity between the parties involved 
in a contract, when the creditors can still request the 
company to take the debt liquidation responsibility. The 
effectiveness of a contractual operation contract between 
shareholders should be recognized as long as the contract 
between shareholders of the company does not do harm to 
the interests of the company’s creditors.
4 .   SETTLEMENT RULES OF THE 
CONFLICT OF SHAREHOLDER’S WILL 
IN THE ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION 
AND SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENT
The current corporate governance in China depends 
mainly on the articles of association and the resolutions 
of the shareholders’ meeting. Shareholders can agree on 
their rights and obligations that are different from the 
Company Law through the articles of association or the 
shareholder agreement. Considering that the contents of 
the shareholder agreement tend to overlap with the two, 
effectiveness conflicts occur all the time. The judgment 
of such conflicts should take into account the positioning 
of the articles of association and resolutions of the 
shareholders’ meeting in the Company Law as well as 
the possibility of conversion between the shareholder 
agreement and the two on the one hand. On the other 
hand, it should also take into account the contractual 
attribute of the shareholder agreement, which, even if 
being not in line with the provisions of the Company Law, 
may possess certain contractual effectiveness. The specific 
analysis should be conducted in the following situations:
On condition that the conflictive item is the absolutely 
necessary record item in the articles of association, the 
articles of association will definitely be subject to as the 
shareholder agreement has violated the provisions of the 
law (Li, 2017, p.4). The absolutely necessary records of 
the articles of association refer to the basic matters that 
must be included in the articles of association, which are 
usually related to the establishment or organization of the 
company, such as the agreement on the registered capital 
of the company, the domicile of the company, the business 
scope of the company, the establishment of the company’s 
institutions, etc. If the shareholders’ agreement contains 
an agreement on the items absolutely necessary to be 
recorded in the articles of association of the company, 
it can be interpreted in accordance with the contract 
interpretation rules of the contract law in the case that it is 
a supplement and refinement of the absolutely necessary 
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record items. Therefore, despite that in some cases a 
shareholder agreement may involve absolutely necessary 
record items in the articles of association, it might be 
construed as a further supplementary agreement to the 
articles of association. If it is amendment to the absolutely 
necessary record items of the articles of association, the 
shareholder agreement will not be binding on the company 
and the third party, but only impose obligations on the 
parties in the debt law. The parties concerned are obliged 
to make the resolution of the shareholders’ meeting on 
amending the articles of association and file the articles of 
association with the industrial and commercial registration 
authority in accordance with the agreement before the 
external effectiveness is generated.
In the case that the conflicting matter is a relatively 
necessary record item or arbitrary record item in the 
articles of association, it is necessary to consider whether 
the item involves the interests of a third party. Some 
legal acts concerning the corporate organization must 
take a specific form of being recorded in the articles 
of association in accordance with the law, that is, these 
items are invalid unless they are recorded in the articles 
of association of the company, which thereby can be 
simply referred to as the items that can be “agreed” in 
the articles of association by the company as required 
by the Company Law of China. For example, it is 
stipulated by article 42 of the Company Law of China 
that shareholders shall exercise the voting right at the 
shareholders’ meeting in accordance with the proportion 
of their capital contribution, unless otherwise specified 
in the articles of association of the company. In essence, 
the requirement of the form that certain items must be 
included in the company’s articles of association is the 
requirement of transparency, the guarantee of transaction 
safety and the protection of the interests of third parties. 
As an institution with rights and behavioral abilities 
established by shareholders through the formulation 
of articles of association, the company’s profitability 
determines that it will be involved into a transaction 
relationship with a third party. In the transaction, the third 
party is suggested to fully understand the situation of the 
company, understand whether the person who transacts 
on behalf of the company has actually obtained the 
appropriate authorization and understand the legitimacy of 
the transaction decision. Therefore, it is believed by this 
paper that the ultimate purpose of “relatively necessary 
record items” in the articles of association is to meet 
the requirements of transparency and the protection of 
transaction security, so as to ensure the realization of the 
legal relations’ stability. For shareholders, such mandatory 
provisions require them to include “relatively necessary 
items” in the articles of association, while those that are 
only recorded in the shareholder agreement shall have 
no legal effect but merely generate obligations in the 
debt law between shareholders to conclude the articles of 
association according to the content of the shareholder 
agreement. In other words, shareholders are obliged to 
make these items the actual organizational rules of the 
company by including them in the articles of association.
In view of the nature and function of the articles of 
association, the record of the articles of association shall 
prevail in cases involving the interests of a third party, 
while the special agreement shall prevail in cases not 
involving the interests of a third party. For example, a 
shareholder agreement may specify that the effectiveness 
of an agreement on a particular matter takes precedence 
over the effectiveness of the articles of association, such 
as whether new shareholders shall be bound by both the 
articles of association and the shareholder agreement. 
Since the articles of association is not only the contract 
between shareholders but also the organizational basis of 
the company, with the transfer of shares, its effectiveness 
will be directly conveyed to the new shareholders, that is, 
new shareholders are bound by the articles of association 
upon acquiring the shares. Nevertheless, the effectiveness 
of an agreement between shareholders only exists between 
the parties involved in the agreement while the rights and 
obligations in it do not have any direct effect on the new 
shareholders with the transfer of shares. In the case that 
there is no other agreement between the new shareholder 
and the original shareholder, the new shareholder shall 
not be affected by the original shareholder agreement 
after acquiring the shares. Although in law and practice, 
shareholders will make relevant norms for equity transfer, 
restrict the transfer of shares by shareholders in various 
methods or take the new shareholders’ recognition of the 
shareholder agreement as the premise of transfer, etc., new 
shareholders may still not be bound by the shareholder 
agreement in case of enforcement, inheritance, etc..
Finally, on condition that the shareholder agreement 
is formulated by all shareholders, does not involve the 
interests of a third party, and does not make a special 
agreement on the priority of the effectiveness of the 
agreement on a certain item over the effectiveness of 
the articles of association, the time sequence of the two 
formulated will be taken as the judgment standard and 
the principle of last formulated effectiveness priority will 
be adopted. The record in the articles of association shall 
prevail in the case that there is neither special agreement 
nor the time sequence can be determined.
CONCLUSION
As a key tool for the governance of limited liability 
companies in China, the shareholder agreement has 
been approved by the Company Law of a great number 
of countries by virtue of its positive significance in 
building the private order of the governance of limited 
liability companies and protecting the legitimate rights 
and interests of shareholders in the company. However, 
there is still a lack of clear and systematic norms in the 
legal system of China. In conclusion, notwithstanding 
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that the shareholder agreement and the company’s 
articles of association may involve some of the contents 
of the corporate organization, the articles of association 
stipulated in the British and American Company Law 
are classified into the compendium of the articles of 
association and the specification of the articles of 
association, where the compendium of the articles of 
association should be conducted registration publicity 
while the specification of the articles of association is 
not required to be registered. The dichotomy of articles 
of association has greatly improved the flexibility of 
governance of British and American companies. In 
contrast, the widespread application of shareholder 
agreement greatly facilitates the improvement of this 
drawback of the articles of association. Certain rules 
shall be followed in case of conflicts between the 
shareholder agreement and the articles of association of 
the company. It is not advisable to indiscriminately adopt 
only the articles of association or shareholder agreement. 
The actual exertion of the governance function of the 
shareholder agreement depends on the exploration of 
the true will of shareholders and the guarantee of their 
autonomy rights while ensuring the strict implementation 
of the mandatory provisions of the law and the rights 
and interests of the company and the third party as far as 
possible.
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